Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining
- Publication type:
- Scholarly edition
- Metadata:
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- Abstract
- This paper reports data from an ultimatum mini-game in which responders first had to choose whether or not to participate. Participation was costly, but the participation cost was smaller than the minimum payoff that a responder could guarantee himself in the ultimatum game. Compared to a standard treatment, we find that the rejection rate of unfavorable offers is significantly reduced when participation is costly. A possible explanation based on cognitive dissonance is offered.
- Autoren
- Philipp C Wichardt
- Daniel Schunk
- Patrick W Schmitz
- Schlüsselwörter
- C91
- D63
- Cognitive dissonance
- Participation costs
- Sunk costs
- Ultimatum game
- Titel
- Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining
Data source: RePEc
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