Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining
Publikationstyp:
Wissenschaftliche Edition
Metadaten:
Abstract
This paper reports data from an ultimatum mini-game in which responders first
had to choose whether or not to participate. Participation was costly, but the participation
cost was smaller than the minimum payoff that a responder could guarantee himself in the
ultimatum game. Compared to a standard treatment, we find that the rejection rate of
unfavorable offers is significantly reduced when participation is costly. A possible
explanation based on cognitive dissonance is offered.
Autoren
Philipp C Wichardt
Daniel Schunk
Patrick W Schmitz
Schlüsselwörter
C91
D63
Cognitive dissonance
Participation costs
Sunk costs
Ultimatum game
Titel
Participation costs for responders can reduce rejection rates in ultimatum bargaining