Delegation and institutional design in health care rationing

Publikationstyp:
Zeitschriftenaufsatz
Metadaten:
Autoren
  • Claudia Landwehr
  • Katharina Böhm
Sammlungen
  • metadata
ISSN
1468-0491
Ausgabe der Veröffentlichung
4
Zeitschrift
Governance
Schlüsselwörter
  • 320 Politik
  • 320 Political science
Sprache
ger
Paginierung
Seiten: 665 - 688
Datum der Veröffentlichung
2011
Datum der Datenerfassung
2020
Datum, an dem der Datensatz öffentlich gemacht wurde
2020
Zugang
Public
Titel
Delegation and institutional design in health care rationing
Ausgabe der Zeitschrift
24

Datenquelle: METADATA.UB

Andere Metadatenquellen:
Autoren
  • Claudia Landwehr
  • Katharina Boehm
Autoren-URL
https://www.webofscience.com/api/gateway?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=fis-test-1&SrcAuth=WosAPI&KeyUT=WOS:000295098700003&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=WOS_CPL
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0491.2011.01542.x
eISSN
1468-0491
Externe Identifier
  • Clarivate Analytics Document Solution ID: 823CC
ISSN
0952-1895
Ausgabe der Veröffentlichung
4
Zeitschrift
GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY ADMINISTRATION AND INSTITUTIONS
Paginierung
665 - 688
Datum der Veröffentlichung
2011
Status
Published
Titel
Delegation and Institutional Design in Health-Care Rationing
Sub types
  • Article
Ausgabe der Zeitschrift
24

Datenquelle: Web of Science (Lite)

Abstract
<jats:p>The delegation of decision‐making powers to nonmajoritarian, independent agencies has become a significant phenomenon in more and more policy areas. One of these is the health‐care sector, where decisions on the range of services covered within public systems have, in most developed countries, been delegated to specialized bodies. This article offers an analytical framework that seeks to grasp the empirical variety and complexity of delegative processes and appointed institutions. The framework is used to describe decision‐making processes and institutions in six countries: Austria, Germany, Norway, Sweden, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. We find that, although constrained by preexisting institutional structures and traditions, delegators enjoy a considerable degree of discretion in their institutional design choices and engage in strategic design and redesign of appointed bodies.</jats:p>
Autoren
  • CLAUDIA LANDWEHR
  • KATHARINA BÖHM
DOI
10.1111/j.1468-0491.2011.01542.x
eISSN
1468-0491
ISSN
0952-1895
Ausgabe der Veröffentlichung
4
Zeitschrift
Governance
Sprache
en
Online publication date
2011
Paginierung
665 - 688
Datum der Veröffentlichung
2011
Status
Published
Herausgeber
Wiley
Herausgeber URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2011.01542.x
Datum der Datenerfassung
2023
Titel
Delegation and Institutional Design in Health‐Care Rationing
Ausgabe der Zeitschrift
24

Datenquelle: Crossref

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