Moral Disagreement and Moral Education: What’s the Problem?

Publikationstyp:

Zeitschriftenaufsatz

Metadaten:

Abstract

Abstract Although initially plausible, the view that moral education should aim at the transmission of moral knowledge has been subject to severe criticism. In this context, one particularly prominent line of argumentation rests on the empirical observation that moral questions are subject to widespread and robust disagreement. In this paper, I would like to discuss the implications of moral disagreement for the goals of moral education in more detail. I will start by laying out the empirical and philosophical assumptions behind the idea that widespread and robust moral disagreement undermines the prospects of transmitting moral knowledge in educational settings. Having thus provided a specific interpretation of the epistemic dynamics behind this so-called ‘challenge of disagreement’, I will proceed by discussing its didactical implications. More specifically, I will defend two claims: first, I will argue that the challenge of disagreement is not an effective challenge, because it undermines the possibility of knowledge transfer only with respect to a limited set of moral propositions. Second, I will argue that the challenge of disagreement is not a specific challenge, because the epistemically destructive effects of moral disagreement also pose a challenge for other prominent accounts of moral education that were originally proposed as promising alternatives to knowledge transmission accounts. If convincing, my arguments show that knowledge transmission accounts of moral education are in a much better position than is usually expected to incorporate the fact that moral questions are notoriously controversial.

Autoren

Dominik Balg

DOI

10.1007/s10677-023-10399-9

eISSN

1572-8447

ISSN

1386-2820

Ausgabe der Veröffentlichung

Zeitschrift

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

Sprache

Online publication date

2023

Paginierung

5 - 24

Datum der Veröffentlichung

2024

Status

Published

Herausgeber

Springer Science and Business Media LLC

Herausgeber URL