Temptation and commitment in the laboratory

Publikationstyp:
Zeitschriftenaufsatz
Metadaten:
Autoren
  • Daniel Houser
  • Daniel Schunk
  • Joachim Winter
  • Erte Xiao
Autoren-URL
https://www.webofscience.com/api/gateway?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=fis-test-1&SrcAuth=WosAPI&KeyUT=WOS:000423655600018&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=WOS_CPL
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.025
eISSN
1090-2473
Externe Identifier
  • Clarivate Analytics Document Solution ID: FU2CK
ISSN
0899-8256
Zeitschrift
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
Schlüsselwörter
  • Self-control
  • Willpower
  • Temptation
  • Commitment
  • Laboratory experiment
Paginierung
329 - 344
Datum der Veröffentlichung
2018
Status
Published
Titel
Temptation and commitment in the laboratory
Sub types
  • Article
Ausgabe der Zeitschrift
107

Datenquelle: Web of Science (Lite)

Andere Metadatenquellen:
Autoren
  • Daniel Houser
  • Daniel Schunk
  • Joachim Winter
  • Erte Xiao
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.025
ISSN
0899-8256
Zeitschrift
Games and Economic Behavior
Sprache
en
Paginierung
329 - 344
Datum der Veröffentlichung
2018
Status
Published
Herausgeber
Elsevier BV
Herausgeber URL
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.025
Datum der Datenerfassung
2018
Titel
Temptation and commitment in the laboratory
Ausgabe der Zeitschrift
107

Datenquelle: Crossref

Autoren
  • Daniel Houser
  • Daniel Schunk
  • Joachim Winter
  • Erte Xiao
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.025
Zeitschrift
Games Econ. Behav.
Paginierung
329 - 344
Datum der Veröffentlichung
2018
Titel
Temptation and commitment in the laboratory.
Ausgabe der Zeitschrift
107

Datenquelle: DBLP

Abstract
We report data from a novel laboratory experiment on economic decisions under persistent temptations. This type of temptation is ubiquitous, as it refers to any temptation that is present until one either gives in or makes a costly commitment decision to have it removed. Subjects in our experiment are repeatedly offered an option with instantaneous benefit that also entails a substantial reduction to overall earnings. We show that this option is tempting in the sense that a substantial fraction of our subjects incur pecuniary costs to eliminate the choice, and thus commit not to choose this alternative. We find that commitment and giving in to temptation generally occur at the first opportunity, though a non-negligible fraction of subjects delay either making the commitment decision or giving in to temptation. This delay is consistent with the costs of self-control increasing with its use.
Autoren
  • Daniel Houser
  • Daniel Schunk
  • Joachim Winter
  • Erte Xiao
Ausgabe der Veröffentlichung
C
Schlüsselwörter
  • D11
  • C91
  • Self-control
  • Willpower
  • Temptation
  • Commitment
  • Laboratory experiment
Paginierung
329 - 344
Datum der Veröffentlichung
2018
Titel
Temptation and commitment in the laboratory
Ausgabe der Zeitschrift
107

Datenquelle: RePEc

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